Morality is a pervasive aspect of human nature across all cultures, and neuroscience investigations are necessary for identifying what computational mechanisms underpin moral cognition. The current study used high-density ERPs to examine how moral evaluations are mediated by automatic and controlled processes as well as how quickly information and causal-intentional representations can be extracted when viewing morally laden behavior. The study also explored the extent to which individual dispositions in affective and cognitive empathy as well as justice sensitivity influence the encoding of moral valence when healthy participants make moral judgments about prosocial (interpersonal assistance) and antisocial (interpersonal harm) actions. Moral judgment differences were reflected in differential amplitudes for components associated with cognitive appraisal (LPP) as well as early components associated with emotional salience (N1 and N2). Moreover, source estimation was performed to indicate potential neural generators. A posterior-to-anterior shift was observed, with current density peaks first in right inferior parietal cortex (at the temporoparietal junction), then later in medial prefrontal cortex. Cognitive empathy scores predicted behavioral ratings of blame as well as differential amplitudes in LPP and component activity at posterior sites. Overall, this study offers important insights into the temporal unfolding of moral evaluations, including when in time individual differences in empathy influence neural encoding of moral valence.
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Introduction
Humans perceive people, and interactions among them, through a framework that conceptualizes behavior as fundamentally linked with mental states (Malle & Guglielmo, 2012) , and intuitively evaluate their behaviors as morally laden (Hamlin, 2014) . Previous neuroimaging investigations using functional MRI in healthy individuals converge with lesion studies in neurological patients to identify brain mechanisms implicated in moral thinking. There is now solid evidence for the involvement of a network of regions, which include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), amygdala, and insula (e.g., Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012; Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Mendez, 2009; Moll et al., 2007; Young & Dungan, 2012) . Moreover, it is clear that these regions are not specific to the domain of morality. Instead, they comprise several domain-general systems which support intention understanding, decision-making, affective arousal, and attention (Decety & Cowell, 2014; Decety & Howard, 2013; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003; Prehn & Heekeren, 2009; Shenhav & Greene, 2010) .
More recently, there has been a renewed focus on characterizing when in time aspects of these systems contribute to moral judgment. Since event-related potentials (ERPs) measure neural activity with millisecond resolution, they are uniquely suited to capture the time course of information processing in response to morally laden stimuli, and thus provide valuable insights into the relative contributions of attentional, affective, and cognitive systems (Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010) . For instance, one study reported larger N2 amplitudes for moral violations compared to conventional violations (Lahat, Helwig, & Zelazo, 2013) . Moral violations, such as hitting and stealing, involve intrinsic negative consequences for others, such as physical harm or issues of fairness. In contrast, social conventions are behavioral uniformities that serve to coordinate individuals' interactions in a social system (Helwig & Turiel, 2011) . In another study, peak amplitude and latency of the P3 component predicted participants' moral judgments about others' decisions to provide or withhold help (Chiu Loke, Evans, & Lee, 2011 
